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“It was evident from the general tone of the whole party, that they had come to 
regard insolvency as the normal state of mankind, and the payment of debts as 
a disease that occasionally broke out.”
                                                  ― Charles Dickens, 
Little Dorrit  
Any attempted validation of the welfarist credentials of the Consumer Credit Acts 
1974  and  20061 necessitates  an  evaluation  of  not  simply  the  formational 
requirements of credit agreements, but also the mechanics of enforcement and 
whether such comply with the avowed aims of the legislation.2 It is true that the 
judiciary  have  demonstrated  an  enthusiasm  to  emancipate  and  support  the 
debtor in cases ranging from incorrectly stated charges for credit,3 discrepancies 
in interest rates between original and substitute credit agreements4 to connected 
1* Senior Lecturer in Law, Middlesex University, Mauritius.
  The later having been introduced implement Directive 2008/48 on credit agreements for 
consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102 [2008] OJ L133/66 and is effective for 
consumer credit agreements made on or after February 1, 2011. .
2   Described in the Long Title of the 1974 legislation as existing "for the protection of 
consumers" and, judicially, in Southern Pacific Personal Loans Ltd v Walker [2009] EWCA 
Civ  1218 at  [23],  Mummery  L.J.  observed that  "the 1974 Act  was passed to  protect 
consumers of credit, an aim which accounts for its substantive content and conditions its 
judicial interpretation". In the important case of  Carey v HSBC Bank Plc [2009] EWHC 
3417 (QB) at [38], H.H. Judge Waksman QC agreed, stating that "primacy was accorded 
to the protection element of the Act".  More recently,  In  Rankine v American Express 
Services Europe Ltd (2008) C.T.L.C. 195, H.H. Judge Simon Brown QC commented (at [9]) 
on  the  need for  the  legislation to  "protect  the  individual  unsophisticated in  financial 
affairs in contracts with unscrupulous and sophisticated financial institutions" (Although 
he also opined that the legislation was "highly technical" (at [8])). For consumer credit 
agreements generally, note the comments of Sellers L.J. in Reynolds v General & Finance 
Facilities  Ltd  (1963)  107  S.J.  889.  However,  the  complexity  of  the  Act  has  often 
undermined consistent application per Clarke L.J. in McGinn v Grangeworth Securities Ltd 
[2002] EWCA Civ 522 at [1] and the  White Paper,  "Fair,  Clear and Competitive—The 
Consumer  Credit  Market  in  the  21st  Century".  Such  led  to  amendments  under  the 
Consumer Credit Act 2006, predominantly in the areas of licensing, the provision of a 
more extensive range of post-contractual information and the introduction of the "unfair 
relationship". 
3 Wilson v  First  County  Ltd  [2004] 1 AC 416.  This  case was decided under  the  now 
repealed s.127 (3). By virtue of s.127 (1), the court now has a discretion on whether to 
make an enforcement order.
4 Phoenix Recoveries (UK) Ltd v Kotecha [2011] EWCA Civ 105.
5 Office of Fair Trading v Lloyds TSB Plc [2007] UKHL 48; [2008] 1 A.C. 316.
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lender liability claims against overseas suppliers.5  However, it is in the realm of 
default notices that the courts have been afforded the opportunity to adopt a 
more  paradigmatic  approach  to  interpretation at  the expense of  the nascent 
(and  nebulous)  de-minimus test,  which  empowers  them  to  disregard  trivial 
technical  deficiencies where circumstances demand. It  would appear that this 
test, like its tortious “just, fair and reasonableness” counterpart in the tort of 
negligence,  has  the  potential  to  empower  the  courts  to  do  justice  in  the 
circumstances of a particular case where there is a perceived “prejudice” to the 
debtor as a consequence of flawed informational provision. In many ways, this 
acts as a de facto counterbalance to the one-sided nature of many standard form 
regulated consumer credit agreements- often overlooking any flagrant disregard 
for contractual obligations on the part of the debtor who, to use an equitable 
analogy, can all too rarely be said to have gone to law with “clean hands”. This 
notwithstanding,  the  debtors  (or  more  likely,  their  lawyers),  show  clear 
conversance  with  the  purpose  of  the  default  notice,  which  is  to  provide  a 
protective  mechanism to  the otherwise unhindered enforcement  of  regulated 
consumer credit agreements by creditors. Its prescriptive nature ensures debtors 
should be familiar with the nature of their breach and the way to remedy such, 
thereby obviating any prospect of precipitate action by the creditor. 6  
Applicable Law
The key provision is Consumer Credit Act 1974 s.87 which states - 
“Need for default notice.
(1) Service of a notice on the debtor or hirer in accordance with section 88 
(a “default notice”) is necessary before the creditor or owner can become 
entitled, by reason of any breach by the debtor or hirer of a regulated 
agreement,— 
(a) to terminate the agreement, or 
(b) to demand earlier payment of any sum, or 
(c) to recover possession of any goods or land, or 
(d) to treat any right conferred on the debtor or hirer by the agreement as 
terminated, restricted or deferred, or 
5
6 Historically, the requirement for notice as a condition of repossession, existed in a 
range of statutes including the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881 s.14 and the 
Law of Property Act 1925 s.146. However, the Bills of Sale Act 1878, a forebear of the 
Consumer Credit Act, empowered a holder or grantee, "either with or without notice, and 
immediately or at any future time, to seize or take possession". Later incarnations, e.g. 
the Hire Purchase Act 1965 s.25(3), required the service of a default notice. It is likely 
that this is still the position at common law: in Reynolds v General & Finance Facilities 
Ltd (1963) 107 S.J. 889, Sellers L.J. commented "that, the agreement being a one-sided 
one with stringent terms, the plaintiff was entitled to a reminder that his instalments 
were in arrears before it could be terminated." A similar view was expressed by Lord 
Denning M.R. in Eshun v Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd [1971] 1 W.L.R. 722 at 725.
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(e) to enforce any security.”
Essentially, the obligation to serve this notice arises upon breach of a regulated 
credit agreement7 by a debtor and, even where validly served, the creditor may 
only seek the remedies stipulated in the provision where these are identified in 
the credit agreement. However in respect of running account (or open-ended8) 
credit -
“(5) Subsection (1) (d) does not apply in a case referred to in section 98 A 
(4) (termination or suspension of debtor's right to draw on credit under 
open-end agreement).”
This provisions states that - 
“Where a regulated open-end consumer credit agreement, other than an 
excluded  agreement,  provides  for  termination  or  suspension  by  the 
creditor of the debtor's right to draw on credit—
(a) to terminate or suspend the right to draw on credit the creditor must 
serve a notice on the debtor before the termination or suspension or, if 
that is not practicable, immediately afterwards,
(b) the notice must give reasons for the termination or suspension, and
(c) the reasons must be objectively justified.
This is a significant caveat,9 and effectively excuses the creditor from compliance 
with the stricter s.87 requirements in credit card and overdraft default cases 
where there is a pressing need to restrict exposure to further loss.10 Similarly, a 
creditor  is  able  to  issue  proceedings  for  current  arrears  in  running  or  fixed 
amount credit agreements without the need for a default notice- such would fall  
short of termination or a demand for earlier payment. This is helpful, particularly 
as it avoids negotiating the byzantine requirements - substantive and procedural 
- of a valid default notice under s88 which requires –
“Contents and effect of default notice.
(1)The default notice must be in the prescribed form and specify—
7 As defined by ss.8 and 15 Consumer Credit Act 1974.
8 Term introduced by Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48 on credit agreements for 
consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102 [2008] OJ L133/66 art.13.
9 In the face of a "widening" application of default notices, see e.g.in Consolidated 
Finance Ltd v Collins [2013] EWCA Civ 475, the Court of Appeal decided that an 
agreement under which a short-term loan was advanced to a bankrupt still constituted a 
regulated agreement and therefore demanded the service of a default notice to enable 
subsequent enforcement.
10 Indeed, according to s.98A(6), the objective justification envisaged by s.98A(4)(c) 
includes there being "the unauthorised or fraudulent use of credit" or "a significantly 
increased risk of the debtor being unable to fulfil his obligation to repay the credit".
3
(a) the nature of the alleged breach;
(b) if the breach is capable of remedy, what action is required to remedy it 
and the date before which that action is to be taken;
(c) if the breach is not capable of remedy, the sum (if any) required to be 
paid as compensation for the breach, and the date before which it is to be 
paid.”
(2) A date specified under subsection (1) must not be less than  14 days 
after the date of service of the default notice, and the creditor or owner 
shall not take action such as is mentioned in section 87(1) before the date 
so specified or (if no requirement is made under subsection (1)) before 
those 14 days have elapsed.”
This is clearly a “statute-heavy” area of law and s87 must further be read in 
conjunction with  the Consumer Credit  (Enforcement,  Default  and Termination 
Notices) Regulations 198311 (as amended). For purposes of this discussion, its 
key provisions are – 
“2.  (2)  Any notice  to  be given by a creditor  or  owner  in  relation  to a 
regulated agreement to a debtor or hirer under section 87(1) of the Act 
(which relates to the necessity to serve a default notice on the debtor or 
hirer in accordance with section 88 before taking certain action by reason 
of any breach of the agreement by the debtor or hirer) shall contain— 
(a) a statement that the notice is a default notice served under section 
87(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974;
(b)  the information set out in...Schedule 2 to these Regulations...”
Schedule 2 states that the “creditor or owner” must provide the “debtor or 
hirer” with a default notice to include – 
“3. A specification of:—
(a) the provision of the agreement alleged to have been breached;12 and
(b) the nature of the alleged breach of the agreement, specifying clearly the 
matters complained of; and either
(c) if the breach is capable of remedy, what action is required to remedy it 
and the date, being a date not less than fourteen days after the date of 
service of the notice, before which that action is to be taken; or
11 Consumer Credit (Enforcement, Default and Termination Notices) Regulations 1983 (SI 
1983/1561).
12 The wording has been Italicised to highlight the slight amplification from s.88.
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(d) if the breach is not capable of remedy, the sum (if any) required to be paid 
as compensation for the breach and the date, being a date not less than 
fourteen days after the date of service of the notice, before which it is to 
be paid.”
(e) A further key provision is Regulation 6 which requires -
“an unambiguous statement by the creditor or owner indicating, if  any 
action specified under paragraph 3(c) or (d) as required to be taken is not 
duly taken or if no such action is required to be taken, the action which he 
intends to take by reason of  the breach  by the debtor  or  hirer  of  the 
agreement—
(a) to terminate the agreement;
(b) to demand earlier payment of any sum;
(c) to recover possession of any goods or land; 
(d) to treat any right conferred on the debtor or hirer by the agreement as 
terminated, restricted or deferred;
(e) to enforce any security;
(f) to enforce any provision of the agreement which becomes operative 
only on a breach of another provision of the agreement as specified in 
the notice,
at any time on or after the date specified under paragraph 3(c) or (d), or, if no 
action is specified under that paragraph as required to be taken, indicating 
the date, being a date not less than seven days after the date of service of 
the notice, on or after which he intends to take any action indicated in this 
paragraph.”
These  provisions  replicate  those  contained  in  s.87,  and  are  similarly 
circumscribed  by  a  range  of  protective  sanctions.  For  example,  a  significant 
restriction on the creditor’s right to recover possession of goods is contained in 
reg. 7 and the Consumer Credit Act 1974 with respect to goods subject to hire 
purchase or conditional sale agreements, where the debtor has paid one-third or 
more of the total price of the goods. In such a case, the creditor or hirer must 
obtain a court order sanctioning repossession of these “Protected Goods”.13 If 
goods are recovered in breach, the debtor may secure the return of all of the 
money paid to the creditor, regardless of how long he has had the goods.14 A 
court order is also required to enter onto “premises” to secure recovery of goods 
subject  to  hire purchase or  conditional  sale,15 with the consequences of  non-
13 Consumer Credit Act 1974 s.90.
14 Consumer Credit Act 1974 s.91; Capital Finance v Bray [1964] 1 W.L.R. 323.
15 Consumer Credit Act 1974 s.92. This is subject to exceptions, e.g. recovery will  be 
permissible  where  the  debtor  has  disposed  of  the  goods  to  a  third  party:  Helby  v 
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compliance being potentially punitive.16 As a counterbalance to what appears to 
one-sided construct, a hirer may seek a Protection Order,17  where there is a risk 
to  property  pending  possession  proceedings.  In  any  event,  as  mentioned 
previously, s.88 remedies are available only where provided for in the respective 
credit  agreement,  and  remain  stubbornly  contingent  upon the  outcome  of  a 
debtor’s or hirer’s application for a Time Order18, which can, potentially, afford 
the  applicant  considerable  latitude  and  economic  respite  through  a  judicial 
rescheduling of the entire outstanding indebtedness and not simply the amount 
due at the date of the order.19 
Judicial Interpretation of Default Notices
The aforementioned provides a flavour of the ethos of the legislation: consumer 
welfarism. However, to what extent do the courts punish the creditor for flaws in 
the drafting of default notices? Whilst,  ceteris paribus, they should be precise 
and statute-compliant, the legislation is, as written, prolix, complex, and often 
cyclic,  and the nature of the breach rarely straightforward,  meaning that the 
default notice constitutes  a considerable hurdle to be overcome in securing any 
of the remedies outlined. Moreover, the courts are often reluctant to eschew a 
consumer  orientated,  strict  interpretation  of  the  law,  thereby  offering  the 
creditor  relief  only  where  they  demonstrate  a  “de-minimus”  departure  from 
statute when drafting these notices. It was perhaps portentous when, in Eshun v 
Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd.,20 the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning M.R., Edmund 
Davies and Phillimore  L.JJ.),  stretched the language of  the more austere and 
laconic  s.25(3)  Hire  Purchase  Act  1965  21 to  hold to  account  the creditor  for 
wrongful re-taking of a vehicle on hire purchase. This provision required a default 
notice to state:
“the amount which has become due, but remains unpaid, in respect of 
sums to which the relevant provision applies, and requiring the amount so 
stated to be within such period (not being less than seven days beginning 
with the date of service of notice) as may be specified in the notice.”
The hirer had fallen two months into arrears, at which point the creditor served a 
“notice of default” requiring payment within 10 days, failing which they would 
enforce  their  contractual  right  of  determination  and  repossession  on  the 
assumption  that  the  hirer’s  inaction  indicated  his  desire  to  terminate  by 
Matthews [1895] A.C. 471. Clearly, recalcitrance on the part of this third party could, 
conceivably, lead to a claim in conversion.
16 A failure to comply with these requirements may render the creditor liable for trespass.
17 Consumer Credit Act 1974 s.131.
18 Consumer Credit Act 1974 s.129(1).
19 Consumer Credit Act s.136. See, e.g.  First National Bank Plc v Syed [1991] 2 All E.R.  
250 and Southern and District Finance Plc v Barnes [1996] 1 F.C.R. 679; (1995) 27 H.L.R.  
691; [1995] C.C.L.R. 62. By s.130(2), in hire purchase or conditional sale agreements, the 
court can make an order to effectively re-write the entire agreement.
20 Eshun v Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 722.
21 Now repealed.
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repudiation. Following repossession for a failure to fully comply with the notice, 
the hirer sought damages for unlawful seizure. In finding the notice invalid, Lord 
Denning M.R. concluded that any notice must firstly stipulate “the provision upon 
which the owners rely in order to recover possession” as well as the “specified 
consequences” of default.22 Edmund Davies L.J.  fell short of dissenting on this 
interpretation,  simply  elucidating  his  “slight  measure  of  reservation”23,  whilst 
Phillimore  L.J.  preferred  the  view  that  the  notice  should  merely  state  the 
consequences of 
non-payment.24 This approach was redolent of a period of transition in attitudes 
to consumer credit and protection, and any metamorphosis of judicial attitude in 
the  interpretation  of  default  notices  away  from  Lord  Denning’s  more  brutal 
consumerist interpretation of statute has been slight and based on the tentative 
de minimus principle. 
In Woodchester Lease Management Services Ltd v Swain & Co,25 for example, the 
Court  of  Appeal  addressed in  some considerable  detail  the  position  where  a 
default notice fails to comply with the Consumer Credit (Enforcement, Default 
and  Termination  Notices)  Regulations  1983.  In  that  case,  a  notice  issued 
following a failure by the appellant hirer to make payments under a Consumer 
Hire Agreement contained a “critical flaw”: it stated the arrears to be £879.90, 
when the true figure at that time amounted to £634.30. It was on this basis that 
the hirer claimed there had been a failure to comply with the requirement under 
Schedule  2,  Regulation  3(c),  where  the  notice  must  state  “if  the  breach  is 
capable of remedy, what action is required to remedy it...”  Kennedy L.J (sitting 
with Sumner J) in holding for the appellant commented-
“This statute was plainly enacted to protect consumers, most of whom are 
likely  to  be  individuals.  When  contracting  with  a  large  financial 
organisation they are at a disadvantage. The contract is likely to be in 
standard  form  and  relatively  complex  with  a  number  of  detailed 
provisions26...the  scheme  of  the  legislation...would  be  frustrated  if  the 
notice could claim that in order to put matters right the hirer must pay a 
22 Eshun v Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 722 at 726D.
23 Eshun v Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 722 at 727A.
24 Eshun v Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd [1971] 1 W.L.R. 722 at 727G. There was, however, 
concurrence on the attempt to circumvent the then recently decided Financings Ltd v 
Baldock [1963] 2 Q.B. 104, by seeking to impose upon the hirer a repudiatory breach: the 
court stated that his falling two months into arrears was not repudiatory. Of course, this 
approach is often circumvented by the credit agreement stating that punctual payment 
is "of the essence" and therefore a "condition", so the failure to pay a single instalment 
will constitute a repudiatory breach enablng the creditor to recover damages to the 
extent as if the agreement had run its course: Yeoman Credit Ltd v Waragowski [1961] 1 
W.L.R. 1124.
25 Woodchester Lease Management Services Ltd v Swain & Co [2001] G.C.C.R. 2255.
26 It was in Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement Maritime SA v Rotterdamsche Kolen 
Centrale [1967] 1 A.C. 361 HL at 406, that Lord Reid suggested that such imbalance 
undermines freedom of contract.
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sum far in excess of the amount in fact owing and yet constitute a valid 
notice...”27
Whilst engaging, he went on to say that “the court might overlook an error which 
could be described as no more than de minimus.”28 Critically, such is, in effect, 
suggesting that s.87 affords the sort of judicial discretion conferred on the courts 
by s.127, where there has been a failure to comply with formalities. This is fine, 
save to say that unlike s.127, s.87 is silent on the point. A better view could be 
that Kennedy L.J. was simply referring to the need for a purposive or golden rule-
based interpretation of the statute to avoid injustice (or absurdities) arising from 
too strict an approach. In any event, such provides an interesting and significant 
caveat to literal interpretation, and implicitly advocates a case by case approach 
to the legitimacy of default notices which does, conceivably, permit the court to 
take into account a range of considerations, including the conduct of the debtor.
In  Rankine v  American Express Services Europe Ltd and Others,29 a case that 
truly does reward its reading, not least for H. H. Judge Simon Brown QC’s often 
entertaining dismissal of the claimants’ attempts to avoid liability under several 
consumer  credit  agreements,  the  court  had  to  consider  the  legitimacy  of  a 
default  notice  which  failed  to  state  the  exact  provision  of  the  agreement 
supposed to have been breached, simply claiming “that the terms and conditions 
have  been  breached”.  The  Consumer  Credit  (Enforcement,  Default  and 
Termination Notices) Regulations 1983 state that the default notice must specify 
“(a) the provision of the agreement alleged to have been breached.” 30 A failure 
to provide such fundamental information would surely exceed the de minimus 
exception advocated in Woodchester? Surprisingly, H. H. Judge Simon Brown QC 
opined that-
“There is no merit in the contention that the fact that the default notice 
failed to specify the precise term which D had breached was fatal to the 
effect of the default notice served. It was clearly stated when read as a 
whole what the breach was and what was required to be done to remedy 
it. Second, even if there was a breach, it was a de minimus breach of the 
provisions of the Enforcement Regulations and of significance.”
Whilst sensible to classify as de minimus the slight overstatement of sums due, a 
failure  to  stipulate  the   relevant  provision  was  arguably  of  fundamental 
significance  going  beyond  what  was  anticipated  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in 
Woodchester, where Kennedy L.J. stated that the debtor –
27 Woodchester Lease Management Services Ltd v Swain & Co [2001] G.C.C.R. 2255 at 
2255.
28 Woodchester Lease Management Services Ltd v Swain & Co [2001] G.C.C.R. 2255 at 
2261.
29 Rankine v American Express Services Europe Ltd [2008] C.T.L.C. 195.
30 Consumer Credit (Enforcement, Default and Termination Notices) Regulations 1983 (SI 
1983/1561) Sch.2(a) para.3.
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 “needs to know precisely what he or she is said to have done wrong and 
what he or she needs to do to put matters right. That, as it seems to me, 
is the scheme of the legislation.”31
In  light  of  this,  the  approach  of  the  High  Court  would  appear  to  have  been 
generous to the creditor (and arguably informed by the historical conduct of the 
debtor  in  seeking  to  avoid  liability  under  credit  agreements,  whereas  in 
Woodchester, the degree of culpability was considerably less grave),32 although 
its approach is not universally accepted. For example, in the recent Scottish case 
of Citifinancial Europe plc v Rice, 33 the court identified inadequacies in the single 
default notice issued to cover  two regulated credit agreements in breach,34 a 
failure to identify the parties to the agreements and, most significantly, a lack of 
clear reference to the matters complained of. In dismissing the creditor’s action 
for  recovery  of  possession  of  the  security  (there  were  arrears  totalling 
£17,023.51), Sheriff A F Deutsch commented that whilst -
“from  the  standpoint  of  lawyers  statement  of  a  particular  clause  or 
paragraph number  would  ordinarily  be regarded as  sufficient…I do not 
think it can be said that on its own this amounts to clear specification of 
the matters complained of.”35
Significantly, this was despite the Sheriff finding it “to be clear notice that the 
provision, which had been breached…is that requiring the payment of monthly 
instalments”.36 So, despite it  being obvious which term has been broken, the 
notice  must  clearly  identify  such.  Here,  the court  concluded that  the defects 
evidenced in the case went beyond de minimus and were fundamental,37 a view 
more  in  line  with  Woodchester.  Notably  we  were  further  reminded  of  the 
increasing relevance of the extent of any “prejudice” towards the debtor in the 
de minimus equation, a point earlier raised by the Court of Appeal in Brandon v 
American Express Services Europe Ltd.38 In this case, Mr Brandon had failed to 
make payments under a regulated credit card agreement prompting American 
Express (“Amex”) to issue him with a default notice (19 June 2007) threatening 
termination of the agreement should he not remedy the breach (and make a 
minimum payment of £275.80). Mr Brandon failed to make this payment and was 
served with a Notice of Cancellation and in 2009 Amex issued proceedings in 
sum of £6,624.24 to include interest and costs. Unlike aforementioned authority, 
31 Woodchester Lease Management Services Ltd v  Swain & Co [2001] G.C.C.R. 2255 at 
2261.
32 The court made several other minor comments on default notices, most notably that a 
notice  will  not  be  invalidated  by  virtue  of  elements  of  monies  claimed  becoming 
irrecoverable under other legislation—essentially, the creditor need only "state the sums 
due on the face of the agreement" (at [50]).
33 Citifinancial Europe Plc v Rice (2013) Hous. L.R. 23.
34 Such  a  practice,  although  irregular,  is  doubtless  permissible,  see,  e.g.  Goode, 
Consumer Credit Law and Practice at [5.1670] and Ropaigealach v Allied Irish Bank Plc  
[1996] C.L.Y. 416.
35 Citifinancial Europe Plc v Rice (2013) Hous. L.R. 23 at [11]–[12].
36 Citifinancial Europe Plc v Rice (2013) Hous. L.R. 23 at [12].
37 Citifinancial Europe Plc v Rice (2013) Hous. L.R. 23 at [15].
38 Brandon v American Express Services Europe Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1187.
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this default notice had seemingly provided too little time for the appellant to 
remedy the breach: whereas s.88(2) states that the date specified in the notice 
“must not be less than 14 days after the service of the default notice, and the 
creditor shall  not take action...before the date so specified”,  here,  the notice 
required the breach to be remedied “within fourteen calendar days from date of  
the default  notice” (emphasis added). There was clearly a discrepancy which 
could  arguably  eclipse  the  appellant  having  complied  with  all  other 
requirements.39 Amex were granted summary judgment at  both first  instance 
and on appeal to the High Court, where H.H. Judge Denyer QC commented that 
the defence claim that less than 14 days had been allowed by the default notice 
to  remedy  the  breach  could  not  be  dismissed  “as  being  unreal”,  but  was 
persuaded by the contention that Mr Brandon had not suffered “any prejudice at 
all by virtue of that technical breach” as no enforcement action was taken with 
fourteen days of the notice- indeed a Notice of Cancellation was not sent to Mr 
Brandon until 11 July 2007.  The Court of Appeal, however, allowed Mr Brandon’s 
appeal thereby reversing the award of summary judgment with Gross L.J stating 
–
“as a matter of construction of the Default Notice I  cannot accept that 
Amex is plainly right in contending that the 14 day period ran from the 
service of the Notice as opposed to “the date of this Default Notice” as the 
Notice on the terms stated; to the contrary,  Mr Brandon has much the 
better of the argument on this point of construction.”40
Essentially,  Mr  Brandon  was  able  to  show  “a  real  prospect  of  a  successful 
defence”41 as it was realistically arguable that the apparent technical flaw in the 
default notice would not - 
“be overlooked as de minimus...both to the failure to allow a minimum 14 
day period and to the absence of prejudice flowing from the defect in the 
Default Notice.”42 
As  a  test  of  validity,  this  suggests  a  clear  divergence:  is  de  minimus  to  be 
determined by the extent of the departure from the statute  or by whether this 
has caused some quantifiable prejudice to the debtor- economic or otherwise or 
both? Moreover, what would constitute prejudice?43 In this case, it is extremely 
difficult  to  identify  where  the  prejudice  would  lie:  it  was  accepted  that  no 
enforcement action had been taken within the 14 days of service and, a fortiori, 
Gross L.J. concluded it to be “indisputable” that Mr Brandon had no intention of 
39  CPR Pt 6.26 suggests that the deemed date of service by post is 2 days after posting, 
although as the Court of Appeal noted, these do not directly apply to default notices and 
stand as guidance only.
40 Brandon v American Express Services Europe Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1187 at [29].
41 CPR Pt 24.2 (a) (ii) having been considered.
42 Brandon v American Express Services Europe Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1187 at [30].
43 In HFO Capital Ltd v Burney [2011] E.W. Misc. 23 (CC), Hill J. suggested (at [15]) such 
could arise by the creation of an adverse credit rating as a consequence of a notice being 
served.
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making further payments.44 As such, it would appear that the mere fact of non-
compliance may, in certain cases, be conclusive, although the consequences for 
the creditor  would  be punitive  and potentially  reward  the  debtor’s  economic 
management. The fact that the Court of Appeal did not offer clear guidance on 
whether a technical deficiency in a default notice can be ignored where devoid of 
prejudice is lamentable.45 
This  ambiguity  is  enunciated  by  the  possible  consequences  of  issuing  “bad” 
default notices. It appears likely that once a creditor terminates an agreement on 
the back of a technically defective default notice, it arguably constitutes unlawful 
repudiation of the credit agreement- such was the view of the Court of Appeal in 
Eshun v  Moorgate  Mercantile  Co Ltd,46 which ordered the respondent  to  pay 
compensation for wrongful retaking of a vehicle subject to hire purchase. It was 
unfortunate that the court in  Brandon  was concerned with summary judgment 
only- Amex had sought to enforce the agreement through the service of a Notice 
of Cancellation followed by proceedings for the outstanding debt, but the court 
was not required to comment further on the consequential impact of the flawed 
notice-  in  other  words,  did  it  render  the  agreement  unenforceable?  Judicial 
dictum indicating that a flawed notice need merely be re-drafted and served 
would almost certainly be limited to cases where there has not been an attempt 
at termination or recovery of possession.47
Conclusion
Dickens, a quintessential champion of social justice (as he perceived it), would 
doubtless be satisfied at the courts’ interpretations of default notices and their 
ostensibly  welfarist  approach. It  is  true,  that  such  appears  to  have  been 
tempered where the debtor has demonstrated an erudite and serial capacity for 
manipulation  of  the Consumer Credit  Act  -  a  clear  example being  Rankine v 
American Express Services Europe Ltd (where H. H. Judge Simon Brown QC noted 
the  claimants’  contentions  “that  there  are  loopholes  in  the  Act  and  the 
Regulations  that  nobody  else  had  detected  before…and  that  this  enables 
consumers to run up debts and not pay for them”48) – but, generally speaking, a 
44 Brandon v American Express Services Europe Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1187 at [5].
45 The Court of Appeal reversed the High Court decision on a further claim by Amex that 
there had been, in any event, valid non-default contractual termination (now per s.98A) 
effected by the service of Notice of Cancellation on July 11 (pursuant to cl.10(2) of the 
regulated  agreement).  Gross  L.J.  stated  such  had  "evolved  into  the  decisive  issue…
without  any  pleadings  whatsoever"  (at  [38])  and  "this  was  simply  too  significant  a 
change of case" but,  obiter, commented that "this issue was realistically arguable on 
both sides…had the procedural groundwork been laid. But here that had not been done" 
(at [40]).
46 Eshun v Mooorgate Mercantile Co Ltd [1971] 1 W.L.R. 722.
47 e.g. Harrison v Link Financial Ltd [2011] E.C.C.26 at [75] per H.H Judge Chambers QC, 
where the agreement was deemed unenforceable for a failure to comply with a range of 
informational requirements under the Consumer Credit Act 1974, but it was doubtless 
the case, that a defective default notice was a key consideration in the court’s ultimate 
pronouncement on the matter.
48 Rankine v American Express Services Europe Ltd [2008] C.T.L.C. 195 at [8].
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test based upon such a factor would inevitably lead to confusion and undermine 
certainty in consumer credit law and enforcement. Instead, the courts may do 
little  more  than  expect  the  creditor  to  “get  it  right”  subject  to  de  minimus 
variations as informed by the vague and as yet undefined “prejudice” test- after 
all, they are often possessed of the resources and experience to do so and, as 
opined by Lord  Brown in  Office  of  Fair  Trading v  Lloyds  TSB Bank plc,49 the 
absorption of these by the creditor sits as part of “a fair balance between the 
creditor and the debtor” in such relationships.
49 Office of Fair Trading v Lloyds TSB Bank Plc [2007] UKHL 48 at [19].
12
